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What’s “Different” (Enough) in  
Eighth Amendment Law? 
 
 
Richard S. Frase∗ 
 
In Miller v. Alabama1 and Jackson v. Hobbs2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
its conclusions in two earlier cases, Roper v. Simmons3 and Graham v. Florida,4 
that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing”5 in ways that justify greater Eighth Amendment protection from 
severe sentences.  Miller and Jackson (hereafter referred to for most purposes as 
Miller) also reaffirmed the Court’s conclusion in Graham that, although “death is 
different” for purposes of Eighth Amendment law, some of the substantive and 
analytic principles previously applied only in death penalty cases can also be 
applied to the most severe prison sentence, life without possibility of parole 
[LWOP].6  Thus, Graham held that at least some LWOP sentences can be 
invalidated using the categorical (all-cases-of-this-type) approach that the Court 
had previously applied only in death penalty cases.7  Before Graham, all 
challenges to prison sentences were as-applied-to-these-facts, and the standards, 
first announced in Solem v. Helm8 and later modified in Harmelin v. Michigan9 
and Ewing v. California,10 were almost impossible for defendants to meet.  
Graham essentially held that, although death is different, so is LWOP, at least for 
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes.11  In Miller the majority likewise took 
a categorical approach (without identifying that as a threshold issue), and likewise 
                                                                                                                            
∗   Richard S. Frase is the Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law at the University of 
Minnesota. 
1   132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
2   132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). 
3   543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
4   130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
5   Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
6   Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2015–17.  
7   Id.  For further discussion of Graham, and the ways in which its categorical standards differ 
from and are easier for defendants to meet than the as-applied standards previously used in challenges 
to severe prison sentences, see Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News—And Not, 23 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 54 (2010). 
8   463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983). 
9   501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
10  538 U.S. 11 (2003). See infra notes 110–13 and accompanying text for further discussion 
of Solem, Harmelin, and Ewing. 
11  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2015–17 (2010). 




recognized that juveniles are different.12  But Miller also applied a further 
“different” factor that was held to justify striking down juvenile LWOP sentences 
even for homicide crimes: the challenged sentence was mandatory (a “different” 
factor previously applied only to the death penalty).13 
So—what else are courts likely to view as “different” (enough) to justify 
closer Eighth Amendment scrutiny?  Clearly, given Roper, Graham, and Miller, 
courts are most likely to expand Eighth Amendment protections so as to invalidate 
non-mandatory LWOP sentences imposed on juveniles in adult court, invoking 
one or more of the additional categorically-different factors that were previously 
applied only in death penalty cases (e.g., low-culpability felony-murder 
accomplices).14  The various recognized or emerging “different” factors could very 
well also combine in ways that support invalidating some transferred-juvenile 
sentences less severe than LWOP, particularly when the sentence is mandatory.  
In the remainder of this essay I will say very little about juveniles other than 
to suggest applications of reduced-culpability analysis to adults with similar 
attributes.  I also will not discuss the possibility that Graham and Miller could lead 
to broader (or narrower) limitations on death sentences.15  Instead, I want to focus 
on adult offenders and severe prison sentences, in light of all the other things the 
Court has held to be “different” enough, when combined with other “different” 
factors, to justify Eighth Amendment prohibition.  Besides the death penalty and 
juvenile offenders, the list of recognized “different” factors now includes:  
 
• LWOP16 
• nonhomicide crimes of conviction (death is different on the offense 
side, too)17 
• low-culpability felony-murder accomplices18 
• mentally retarded offenders19 
• mandatory penalties20 
                                                                                                                            
12  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457–60 (2012). 
13  Id.  
14  See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788–89, 801 (1982). 
15  For discussion of these possibilities, see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets 
the Sun Shine In: The Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off 
Approaches to Eighth Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79, 82 (2010). 
16  Besides Graham and Miller, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 (1983), also implicitly 
recognized the particular severity of LWOP sentences, using that factor to distinguish an earlier case, 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), involving a life-with-parole sentence.  In Graham, the 
majority quoted and reaffirmed Solem’s view of the almost-like-death severity of an LWOP sentence.  
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027–28. 
17  See id. at 2034; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412–13 (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). 
18  See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788–89.  
19  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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In light of this diverse and seemingly still-growing list of “different” factors, I 
will argue that Miller may turn out to be more than “only a juvenile case,” and may 
lead to further applications of categorical analysis in the same way that Roper and 
Graham did—Roper’s treatment of juveniles made it more than “just a death 
penalty case” (even though death is still different), and Graham’s treatment of 
LWOP sentences was subsequently extended to offenders convicted of homicide 
crimes (even though death is different on the offense side).   
I will examine two broad routes for potential expansion of the Court’s “that’s-
different” analysis.  Part I examines the prospects for successful categorical 
challenges to adult LWOP sentences.  Part II adopts the working assumption that 
as-applied (Solem-Harmelin-Ewing) analysis will remain the sole method for 
challenging adult prison sentences.  But I argue that, in a number of ways, the 
expanded “that’s-different” analysis suggested in the Court’s recent categorical-
analysis cases may suggest new grounds for Eighth Amendment relief in as-
applied challenges. 
 
I. CAN SUCCESSFUL CATEGORICAL CHALLENGES BE MADE TO SEVERE ADULT 
PRISON SENTENCES? 
 
It could be argued that, in light of Graham and Miller, the majority of justices 
now have a preference for categorical analysis of Eighth Amendment challenges, 
at least when enough “differents” are present.  Such a preference might, in turn, 
suggest a willingness to respond favorably to additional challenges of this type, 
even in adult cases.  But why should such “differents” call for more protective, 
categorical analysis?  I will argue that the Court properly applies such analysis 
whenever, due to penalty severity and other factors, as-applied analysis poses an 
unacceptable risk of failing to detect and prevent constitutionally-forbidden 
disproportionate punishment.  In this sense, the choice of categorical analysis is 
analogous to the application of strict scrutiny in Equal Protection and First 
Amendment cases—more protective standards are deemed necessary in certain 
contexts.  Categorical analysis also has several other advantages: it is easier for 
courts to apply and produces more consistent results.  
The contrary view of Graham and Miller is that the Court really had no 
choice but to apply categorical analysis, and thus expressed no preference for that 
approach.  Moreover, at least the more cautious justices will hesitate to approve 
any expansion of this approach to adult cases unless some principles can be 
derived to help the Court decide when enough “differents” are present.  And if the 
categorical approach is to be favored, or at least expanded to new contexts, how 
                                                                                                                            
20  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2455 (2012); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding 
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments “require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of 
capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death” (footnotes omitted)). 




exactly will it be defined?  Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller follows a 
different analytical path than Graham and the earlier death penalty decisions, and 
says very little about why it is doing so.21  Her opinion, and Justice Kennedy’s in 
Graham, also make no mention of the underlying “gross disproportionality” 
standard that previously governed prison sentences, and at one time was also 
applied to capital punishment.22  Why is that?   
These issues will be addressed below, as follows.  Section A considers 
whether there is, or should be, a preference for categorical adjudication, even if 
that will not and cannot become the Court’s exclusive approach.  Section B 
examines the manner in which categorical analysis was applied in Graham and 
Miller, and the implications for future applications of this approach.  Section C 
briefly reviews the Court’s prior cases granting Eighth Amendment relief, and 
argues that they fall into a pattern suggesting a set of principles to guide the Court 
and lower courts in future categorical challenges.  Section D considers whether 
there are now five votes to overrule Harmelin on its facts (mandatory LWOP for a 
nonhomicide crime, imposed on an adult first offender).  Section E argues that 
even if Harmelin will not be overruled on its facts, that case should not prevent 
courts from recognizing further categorical limits in adult non-capital sentencing—
including cases similar to Harmelin, but with additional “different” factors. 
 
A. Is There—or Should There Be—a Preference for Categorical Eighth 
Amendment Standards? 
 
Miller is a categorical, all-cases-of-this-type ruling, explicitly modeled after 
Graham, Roper, and the Court’s earlier cases imposing substantive limits on death 
penalty eligibility.23  But unlike Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Graham, 
Justice Kagan’s Miller opinion did not begin by explaining and justifying the 
choice of a categorical approach.24  Perhaps she simply assumed that, since 
Graham had applied categorical analysis to an LWOP penalty, the Court must take 
the same approach in addressing the LWOP penalties in Miller.  But none of these 
cases—Graham, Miller, or the death-penalty-eligibility cases—makes clear why 
the extreme severity of a penalty and certain other “different” factors call for 
categorical rather than as-applied analysis. 
In Graham, Justice Kennedy began his opinion by explaining that the Court 
was taking a categorical approach rather than engaging in as-applied-to-these-facts 
adjudication because the defendant had specifically raised a categorical 
                                                                                                                            
21  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–60. 
22  Id. at 2460–75; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017–34.  
23  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458–60. 
24  Later in Justice Kagan’s opinion, she briefly defended the use of that approach by noting 
that Graham had likened LWOP penalties to the death penalty, and had therefore applied the 
categorical approach previously only used in death penalty cases.  Id. at 2466.  
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challenge.25  The same was true in Miller—both defendants had framed the issues 
in categorical terms.26  But Justice Kagan did not mention that fact; she merely 
cited the Court’s prior categorical bans (in death penalty cases and Graham), and 
proceeded to apply that approach.27  There are also problems with the “petitioner-
requested-it” rationale in Graham.  As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his 
concurrence,28 Mr. Graham had raised an additional, as-applied challenge, and 
Roberts believed the majority could and should have chosen to rule on those 
grounds—in effect saying: “we only allow categorical challenges in death penalty 
cases.”  Of course, the Court could no longer say that after Graham.  But should 
the choice of approach depend on petitioners’ framing of the issues, given the ease 
with which they can re-cast their arguments in categorical terms, and the apparent 
benefit to them in doing so?   
It could also be argued that challenges to mandatory penalties are inherently 
categorical, since such statutes arguably impose a distinct type of penalty, 
applicable to a ready-made category of crimes.  But the Court could still have 
opted for a Solem-Harmelin-Ewing as-applied analysis (just as the plurality and 
dissenters did in Harmelin).  Instead, Justice Kagan leaped immediately to 
categorical analysis, without even identifying that as a choice or a threshold issue 
(and without mentioning the defendants’ requests for a categorical ruling, the 
absence of such a request in Harmelin, or the Graham precedent applying that 
approach to LWOP sentences).29 
In light of the minimal reasoning in Graham and Miller regarding the choice 
of categorical analysis, perhaps the majorities in these cases simply preferred to 
apply that approach.  One obvious reason for at least some justices to prefer 
categorical adjudication is that it seems to grant more constitutional protection than 
an as-applied approach subject to the limitations added by the Harmelin and Ewing 
pluralities.30  Perhaps even Justice Kennedy, the author of the Harmelin plurality, 
now views Harmelin-Ewing analysis as too confining for certain kinds of cases 
and prefers to expand Eighth Amendment protections by shifting to an alternative 
set of standards.  Certainly on the facts of Mr. Miller’s case—intentional, first-
person robbery-homicide by beating the victim and setting his home on fire31—it 
                                                                                                                            
25  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021–23. 
26  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–10, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 
10-9646); See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–10, Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 
10-9647). 
27  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–68. 
28  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2039, n.* (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  Justice Roberts rejected a 
categorical ban because he believed some juvenile nonhomicide offenders merit an LWOP sentence, 
and that as-applied analysis is an adequate method to identify those who do not.  Id. 
29  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–68.  However, later in her opinion Justice Kagan briefly 
defended the choice of categorical analysis.  See supra note 24. 
30  The limitations added in Harmelin and Ewing are discussed in text at notes 110–13, infra. 
31  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 




might be difficult (though not impossible—see further discussion in Part II below) 
to make the “threshold showing” required by Harmelin that the LWOP penalty 
Miller received was grossly disproportionate to his crimes.  Moreover, in as-
applied analysis, the defects of a mandatory penalty might not even be 
justiciable—the question in such analysis is whether LWOP is grossly 
disproportionate to this defendant’s culpability and crime(s), not whether such a 
penalty might be excessive for other defendants subject to the mandatory-LWOP 
law. 
Apart from providing more constitutional protection (a matter of lesser 
concern for moderate justices, perhaps including Kennedy), are there also practical 
reasons to view categorical adjudication as the preferred vehicle for Eighth 
Amendment challenges?  At first blush, this might seem counter-intuitive.  Aren’t 
categorical constitutional bans on a particular penalty very likely to: a) sweep more 
broadly than the core values being protected, b) interfere more frequently (than 
rarely-successful as-applied challenges) in legislative penalty schemes, and c) 
constitute the sort of “judicial activism” that conservatives (and now sometimes 
also liberals) deplore?  The answer to each of the above questions is: yes, that will 
often be true, but no more true than when the Court—whether dominated by liberal 
or conservative justices—has chosen to create overbroad, “bright-line” rules rather 
than continue to apply general standards, one case at a time, under a series of 
“factors” and/or “the totality of the circumstances.”  Such bright-line rules have 
often been recognized in Fourth Amendment cases, usually (but not always) in 
favor of overbroad police powers.32  Other well-known examples of such rules in 
the criminal procedure realm include Miranda warning and waiver requirements 
(though not much is left of that overbroad rule other than the Edwards33 line of 
cases), and the flat requirement of appointed counsel in all felony cases under 
Gideon v. Wainwright.34 
Bright-line and other categorical rules are easier for courts to apply, and they 
protect both trial and appellate courts from a flood of fact-specific challenges.  
Categorical bans on a penalty also tend to lessen sentencing disparities, especially 
the gross disparities that arise when a severe penalty is rarely actually imposed.  
Under a case-specific, as-applied approach, imposition of such a penalty would 
presumably remain rare in practice, but such highly selective severity would make 
the penalty as capricious, wanton, and freakish as some death penalties the Court 
                                                                                                                            
32  See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354–55 (2001) (The police need 
only probable cause to make a custodial arrest, no matter how minor the crime or how lacking in 
case-specific need such an arrest may be.); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (“[A] search 
is a search,” no matter how minor the intrusion, and must be justified by probable cause—not just 
reasonable suspicion.).  
33  See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990) (Edwards protections continue even 
after the suspect has consulted counsel multiple times.); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 583–87 
(1981) (Higher Miranda waiver standards apply whenever the suspect has requested counsel.).  
34  372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).  
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has invalidated.  Given the limits of our adversary and judicial systems, it seems 
almost certain that case-specific review will fail to detect and prevent some cases 
of constitutional disproportionality.  That is particularly likely to be true in cases 
involving juveniles, mentally retarded offenders, or others with substantial 
cognitive and/or emotional limitations.  As Justice Kennedy noted in his Graham 
opinion, any case involving a juvenile offender raises greater risks of poor 
defendant litigation choices and communication with counsel, and limited overall 
defense effectiveness, thus greatly increasing the odds that the offender will 
receive an unconstitutionally severe sentence.35  Finally, the Court has long 
stressed that Eighth Amendment review should, to the greatest extent possible, be 
informed by “objective factors.”36  Categorical rules are arguably more objective 
than any version of the Solem-Harmelin-Ewing standards.37 
In short, even though categorical rules might seem less defensible than case-
specific adjudication, such rules have important normative and systemic 
advantages.  But that does not mean the Court has or should abandon case-specific, 
“standards”-based adjudication of the kind contemplated under the Solem-
Harmelin-Ewing line of cases.  Sometimes the nature of the legal issues or the 
injustice arguably suffered by the complaining party do not permit satisfactory 
categorical analysis (for example, the relevant factors suggesting constitutional 
invalidity may be too numerous and/or too complex or inter-related to yield a 
coherent and workable “rule”).  In that situation, case-specific adjudication, 
applying overall standards and/or multiple relevant factors will be necessary.  
Indeed, Miller effectively recognizes this point in that it requires courts to make a 
case-specific decision about whether to impose LWOP on a juvenile offender.38  
The Court has generally been unsympathetic to such challenges, but the kinds of 
offense, offender, and other factors recognized in categorical-ban decisions may 
make it easier in the future for courts to find Eighth Amendment violations under 
the Solem-Harmelin-Ewing standards (see further discussion in Part II, below). 
 
B. After Miller, How Exactly Does Categorical Analysis Work? 
 
Assuming a defendant’s situation does lend itself to categorical adjudication, 
and that the Court (or a lower court) is willing to entertain such a challenge, how 
exactly is categorical analysis to be conducted?  Justice Kagan’s majority opinion 
in Miller follows a different analytical path than Graham and the earlier death 
                                                                                                                            
35  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010). 
36  See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
37  That is especially true after Harmelin, which made the Solem factors less objective by 
shifting emphasis to the first factor and refusing to define the underlying normative standards that 
apply at each step of the revised Solem analysis.  See generally, Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison 
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005). 
38  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467–68 (2012). 




penalty decisions.  And in neither Miller nor Graham did the majority invoke the 
“gross disproportionality” standard used in as-applied (Solem-Harmelin-Ewing) 
challenges (and also cited in some earlier death penalty decisions). 
In Graham, Justice Kennedy summarized the Court’s categorical-adjudication 
approach as follows: 
 
The Court first considers “objective indicia of society’s standards, as 
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to determine 
whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at 
issue.  [citing Roper].  Next, looking to “the standards elaborated by 
controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and 
purpose,” [citing Kennedy v. Louisiana] the Court must determine in the 
exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment in 
question violates the Constitution [citing Roper].39 
 
But in Miller, instead of beginning with the national-consensus assessment, 
Justice Kagan’s categorical analysis begins with what amounts to the Court’s 
independent judgment—without mentioning the latter by name.  But then, why 
should the Court talk about its policy assessments that way?  The Court is often 
called upon to make such judgments in order to resolve constitutional issues raised 
by the parties, within the space left open (to a ruling either way) by precedent, 
constitutional text, and history.40  In any event, the fact that Justice Kagan does not 
call attention to the Court’s independent judgment, as somehow a distinctive thing 
for the Court to do, may suggest a degree of comfort with more frequent 
recognition of Eighth Amendment limitations.  Putting the national-consensus 
discussion second also suggests that less weight will be given to that step in the 
analysis.  In sum: the order and phrasing of Kagan’s opinion may mean that five 
justices are no longer willing to abdicate their responsibility to play a meaningful 
checks-and-balances role, and protect politically powerless defendants from 
excessive (and highly selective) treatment by legislative and executive officials.   
Justice Kagan’s independent-judgment analysis, like Justice Kennedy’s in 
Graham, considers whether the challenged penalty can be justified under 
generally-accepted purposes of punishment (referred to as “penological 
                                                                                                                            
39  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021–23. 
40  See Douglas A. Berman, Questioning Forceful (But Suspect) Claims by the Varied Miller 
Dissents: Alito/Legislative Judgment Concerns, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (July 2, 2012), available at, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2012/07/questioning-forceful-but-suspect-
claims-by-the-varied-miller-dissents-alitolegislative-judgment-conc.html  (critiquing Justice Alito’s 
complaint in Miller about the Court’s increasingly “inward-looking” jurisprudence, and pointing out 
that the Court (and Justice Alito himself) often makes its own constitutional judgments about 
individual rights protected by the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, and does not 
merely “tally . . . the positions taken by state legislatures”).  
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justifications”).41  Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Graham had seemed to emphasize 
retributive limits on severe penalties, focusing on the different degrees of harm 
caused by homicide and nonhomicide crimes, and on the juvenile offender’s 
limited personal culpability.42  This emphasis suggested that in future cases the 
Court might be willing to find (as it came close to finding in several death penalty 
cases43 and at least one non-death penalty case44) that retributive 
disproportionality, by itself, is sufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment 
violation.  But in Miller, Justice Kagan’s opinion seems to give equal weight to 
retribution and various crime control goals, considering each in turn and finding 
that none of them can justify a mandatory LWOP penalty applied to juveniles.45 
In light of Kagan’s opinion, it seems more clear than ever that a punishment 
will not violate the Eighth Amendment unless it is found to be unjustified in its 
severity (and therefore excessive) relative to every one of these traditional 
sentencing purposes.  To that extent, Miller may be a step backwards, compared 
with Graham and some earlier cases.  Like Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in 
Harmelin, stating that the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate . . . any one 
penological theory,”46 Miller seems clearly to reject the argument I and several 
other scholars47 have advanced: that the Eighth Amendment should place a 
retributive upper limit on the pursuit of crime-control goals.  And if the Court was 
unwilling to recognize such a desert-limit for juveniles, it seems unlikely that the 
Court will do this any time soon for adults.  
The refusal to emphasize retributive proportionality leaves the Court with a 
problem it has had at least since Harmelin—if disproportionality remains the 
underlying injustice that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is designed to 
protect against, and if violations of that Clause require a showing that no 
traditional punishment goal can justify the severity of the penalty being challenged, 
then how should disproportionality be defined and measured relative to non-
retributive goals such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation?  Justice 
                                                                                                                            
41  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.   
42  See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27. 
43  See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420–21, 441 (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977).  
44  Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). 
45  Retribution was rejected because of the diminished culpability of juveniles, which a 
mandatory penalty prevents the sentencing court from considering at all.  Deterrence was rejected 
because the same characteristics that make juveniles less culpable also make them less deterrable 
even by severe penalties.  Incapacitation could not justify LWOP because that penalty requires a 
judgment of permanent incorrigibility, a condition “inconsistent with youth.”  And of course, 
rehabilitation could not justify LWOP because that penalty “foreswears altogether the rehabilitative 
ideal.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
46  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991).  
47  See, e.g., Frase, supra note 37, at 628–34; Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against 
Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 683 (2005); John F. Stinneford, Rethinking 
Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011).  




Scalia has argued that with respect to such goals, the concept of proportionality is 
meaningless—that proportionality is inherently a retributive concept.48 
However, as I have argued in previous writings,49 there are two well-
established non-retributive proportionality principles that have been applied in a 
wide variety of constitutional contexts, in the U.S. and in foreign and international 
law.  Both principles reflect core precepts of utilitarian philosophy that recognize 
that meaningful upper limits must be placed on the severity of government 
measures.  The first principle, what I call “ends-benefits” proportionality, requires 
that the costs and burdens of punishment should not exceed the likely benefits to 
be achieved, and that the added costs and burdens of a more severe penalty 
compared to a lesser one should not exceed the likely added benefits.50  The 
second principle, “alternative-means” proportionality (referred to by some writers 
as the principle of parsimony or necessity, and akin to constitutional requirements 
of “narrow tailoring”) posits that a penalty should be the least severe measure that 
will suffice under the circumstances—if a less severe punishment will achieve the 
same benefits, the more severe penalty is excessive.51  
Both of the principles above may have been implicitly applied in Graham and 
Miller.  These cases each rejected deterrence as a rationale for the challenged 
penalty because juvenile offenders are unlikely to be deterred by severe penalties 
given their immaturity, recklessness, impetuosity, and susceptibility of peer 
pressure; thus, “any limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole is not 
enough to justify the sentence.”52  This “not-worth-it” assessment is a form of 
ends-benefits proportionality analysis.   
Likewise, Graham and Miller implicitly applied alternative-means analysis.  
Both cases rejected incapacitation as a justification for the challenged LWOP 
penalties because such a sentence may prove, years later, to have been 
unnecessarily severe: juveniles have a greater capacity for change than adults, yet 
an LWOP sentence presupposes that all offenders subject to the penalty are 
incorrigible and will remain so until they die.53  This “less-might-prove-to-be-
enough” argument is an application of the alternative-means proportionality 
principle. 
                                                                                                                            
48  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989; Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
49  See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences under Federal and State 
Constitutions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 43–49 (2008); Frase, supra note 37, at 592; E. THOMAS 
SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING 
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 3–11 (2009). 
50  Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State Constitutions, supra 
note 49, at 44–45. 
51  Id. at 45–46.  
52  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).  It is not clear, however, whether the 
Court means that an LWOP sentence will have no deterrent effect on juvenile offenders or whether it 
means that eliminating the possibility of parole will not provide a sufficient marginal increase in 
deterrence relative to a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. 
53  Id. at 2028–30; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).  
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Despite the apparent rejection in Miller of retributive limits on the pursuit of 
deterrence and incapacitation, Justice Kagan’s opinion does, as previously noted, 
suggest a greater willingness to place Eighth Amendment limits on severe prison 
sentences.54  Another sign of this shift may be the disappearance, in the Court’s 
recent categorical rulings, of the “gross disproportionality” standard put forth in 
the Harmelin plurality and repeated by Justice O’Connor in her Ewing plurality.  
This standard is never mentioned in Kagan’s Miller opinion (nor in Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence).55 And in Graham, Justice Kennedy (author of the Harmelin 
plurality), only mentioned the gross disproportionality standard when he was 
discussing as-applied challenges.56  Justice Kagan does, however, frequently 
mention proportionality as the core Eighth Amendment standard.57 
The omission of the qualifier “gross” might suggest that the current majority 
does not view a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation as quite such an 
exceptional event as it once did.  Perhaps unconstitutional disproportionality need 
not be “gross,” at least for the most severe penalties of death and LWOP 
(alternatively, perhaps disproportionality is inherently “gross” and unacceptable 
when such severe penalties are imposed).  References to gross disproportionality 
had already begun to disappear in categorical-ban death penalty cases: that 
standard was only briefly mentioned in the Roper and Kennedy majority opinions, 
quoting language from earlier death penalty cases,58 and there had been no mention 
of the standard by the majority in two earlier juvenile death penalty cases, 
Thompson v. Oklahoma59 and Stanford v. Kentucky.60 
But there may also be another reason to omit or de-emphasize the “gross” 
disproportionality standard in a categorical analysis.  When the Court bans a 
particular penalty for a group of crimes or offenders, it is not necessarily making a 
finding that application of the penalty in such cases would, in every instance, 
impose the kind of grossly excessive punishment that violates the Eighth 
Amendment under as-applied analysis.  Instead, the Court is saying that there is an 
unacceptable risk that at least some of the offenders in that group will receive such 
punishment, and that the only way to ensure that they do not is to ban the penalty 
for the entire category of cases.  The ultimate goal may still be to protect offenders 
from grossly disproportionate severity—especially when the most severe penalties 
are being applied and one or more other “different” factors indicates a heightened 
risk of disproportionality.  But it is not plausible to suppose that every defendant 
                                                                                                                            
54  See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
55  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–82. 
56  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
57  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–75.  
58  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 589 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 429, 441 (2008) (quoting 
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)). 
59  487 U.S. 815 (1988).  
60  492 U.S. 361 (1989). 




benefitting from the categorical ban would otherwise suffer that degree of 
injustice. 
This necessary-overbreadth rationale was reflected in the Graham Court’s 
choice to categorically ban LWOP sentences for all nonhomicide offenders less 
than eighteen years old at the time of their offense, rather than letting courts make 
individualized assessments of the culpability and malleability of each juvenile 
offender.  Citing Roper, in which a similar case-by-case assessment was rejected, 
Justice Kennedy’s Graham opinion concluded that only a broad rule covering all 
juvenile offenders could avoid a number of serious risks: 1) that the aggravating 
circumstances of the conviction offense may overpower mitigating arguments 
based on the offender’s youth; 2) that such erroneous findings might also result 
from the known difficulties some juveniles have in working effectively with their 
lawyers; and 3) that even if correct assessments of these matters were made at the 
time of sentencing, the LWOP sentence will cause some juvenile offenders to be 
unfairly and unnecessarily condemned to die in prison (substantial changes, due to  
maturation, treatment and/or other interventions, or personal effort, might clearly 
show that the terrible crimes they committed as teenagers were not representative 
of their true characters).61  In Miller, similar reasoning underlay the Court’s 
rejection of mandatory LWOP penalties: “By making youth (and all that 
accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a 
scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”62 
This line of reasoning is nothing new, of course.  A number of constitutional 
criminal procedure doctrines are deliberately over-protective, based on the Court’s 
view that there would otherwise be an unacceptable risk of constitutional 
violations.  Thus, as the Court has recently emphasized, Miranda is 
constitutionally required not because every confession obtained in custodial 
interrogation without warning and waiver safeguards is coerced, but because 
without compliance with those safeguards there is an unacceptable risk that some 
offenders will be convicted based on coerced statements.63  In Bruton v. United 
States64 and subsequent cases, the Court found a denial of the right of 
confrontation when a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession, directly 
implicating the defendant-appellant, was admitted in their joint trial.  The Court 
found that limiting instructions telling the jury to disregard the confession as to 
defendant-appellant were insufficient due to the unacceptable risk that jurors 
would ignore those instructions.65  Similarly, search warrants (where applicable) 
are required not because every violation of this requirement means that the search 
                                                                                                                            
61  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032–33.   
62  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
63  United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428, 442 (2000).  
64  391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
65  Id.  at 136–37. 
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lacked probable cause or otherwise violated Fourth Amendment requirements, but 
because in the absence of a warrant there is an unacceptable risk that such 
violations will occur and not be prevented or detected after the fact.66 
 
C. Categorical Challenges, Past and Future: What’s “Different” Enough? 
 
Even if categorical challenges are now preferred by the Court, or at least will 
be more readily tolerated, and even if a challenged penalty and the offender’s 
conviction offense and/or personal characteristics seem to suggest a workable 
categorical rule, how can the Court (and lower courts) know when to use this 
approach to recognize a new Eighth Amendment limitation?  In this section I 
review the Court’s prior cases approving categorical challenges, and use these 
cases to identify some general patterns that may suggest useful guiding principles 
for future categorical challenges (those challenges are discussed more fully in 
sections D and E below).  Essentially, the question I am asking is: how many 
“different” factors does it take to justify a new categorical ban?  The discussion 
below assumes that, for the foreseeable future, the death penalty will continue to 
be viewed as constitutionally different, even from LWOP, so I separately analyze 
the Court’s cases invalidating each of these extremely-severe penalties.  In the 
third subsection below, I consider what guidance can be gleaned from two older 
cases, involving neither the death penalty nor LWOP, in which the Court found an 
Eighth Amendment violation.  
One obvious limitation of any schema based on the number and type of 
“differents” is that such factors, whether viewed individually or in groups, can only 
serve as a guide to how the Court makes its “independent judgments” about the 
constitutionality of a penalty in particular circumstances.  What about the “national 
consensus” element in categorical analysis?  As indicated above, Justice Kagan’s 
opinion in Miller puts this element second67 (it had come first as recently as 
Graham),68 which may indicate an intent to de-emphasize this step in the analysis.  
Indeed, Justice Alito’s dissent argues that this element has been downgraded so 
much that the Court’s decisions are “now entirely inward looking.”69  But it seems 
likely that the Court will continue to examine existing laws and practices, to make 
sure its categorical bans are not invalidating penalties that enjoy substantial public, 
legislative, and practitioner support. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
66  See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354–59 (1967) and Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).  In both cases, the Court refused to retroactively validate a warrantless 
search despite the government’s claim that prior to the search the police had ample grounds to obtain 
a court order fully authorizing the search they conducted.   
67  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2459. 
68  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.   
69  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting). 




1. Death Penalties 
 
Although the Court has not expressed the holdings in this way, its cases 
recognizing categorical bans on capital punishment can be viewed as all requiring 
two “differents”: the death penalty itself, and one other factor.  Those other factors, 
in the order in which they were first recognized, are: 
 
• Mandatory penalty70  
• Nonhomicide conviction offense71  
• Low-culpability felony-murder accomplice72  
• Juvenile offender73 
• Mentally retarded offender74  
 
Although Justice Kagan’s opinion in Miller viewed the first of these factors 
and the next four as falling into two distinct “strands” of precedent,75 they could 
also be classified in other ways.  The first factor relates to sentencing procedure; 
the next two relate to the offense or the defendant’s role in it; and the last two are 
based on offender characteristics.  What these five factors have in common is the 
Court’s conclusion that, for at least some offenders falling in each category, 
imposition of the death penalty is likely to be unconstitutionally excessive, so that 
penalty must be banned in all such cases (the undue-risk, necessary-overbreadth 
rationale discussed earlier).  
 
2. LWOP Sentences 
 
In Graham and Miller, part of the rationale for expanding the categorical 
approach to LWOP appeared to be that this penalty is, in some ways, as severe as 
capital punishment—“the sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is 
irrevocable,” denying all hope of restoration.76  Nevertheless, an analysis of the 
Court’s cases invalidating LWOP penalties suggests that it takes a stronger 
showing to invalidate LWOP than the death penalty.  In effect (although not in any 
formal language of the opinions), LWOP penalties will only be struck down if 
there are three “different” factors: the LWOP penalty itself, and two other 
                                                                                                                            
70  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
71  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).  
72  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 782 (1982).  
73  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988).  
74  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
75  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012). 
76  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
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factors.77  Those other factors, in the order and combinations in which they were 
recognized, are: 
 
• Juvenile offender + nonhomicide conviction offense78 
• Juvenile offender + mandatory penalty79 
 
All of these other (non-LWOP) factors had previously been recognized in 
death penalty cases.  But as noted above, in death cases the presence of one of 
these “differents” was deemed sufficient to render the death penalty 
unconstitutional.  The facts of Graham and Miller could be read to imply that the 
death penalty is still different, and that even a prison sentence as severe as LWOP 
requires two other “differents,” not just one.   
Two other LWOP cases have come before the Court, and in one of them, 
Solem v. Helm, the Court found the penalty unconstitutional.80  Although Solem 
should presumably be deemed an as-applied decision (under a version of that 
approach more favorable to defendants than the versions later applied in Harmelin 
and Ewing),81 it might be possible to view Solem as a categorical ruling.  Indeed, 
this view of Solem might be required in order to uphold the result in that case 
notwithstanding subsequent tightening of as-applied standards.  In order to view 
Solem as a categorical ban on LWOP, comparable to the later bans in Graham and 
Miller, the analysis above suggests that it would be necessary to identify at least 
two other “different” factors in Solem.  Possible candidates include: 
 
• Minor, non-violent conviction offense  
• Non-violent prior record 
• Intra-jurisdictional disproportionality (Solem prong 2) 
• Inter-jurisdictional disproportionality (Solem prong 3) 
 
None of these possible “different” factors has been recognized as such in 
either death penalty or more recent, categorical-ban LWOP cases, but that 
observation could suggest several, very different conclusions: a) Solem is no longer 
good law on its facts; or b) Solem is still good law but such a case is not well-
suited to categorical rules, so the result must be analyzed and justified under as-
applied analysis (which might not change the result, see further discussion of the 
future of as-applied analysis, Part II infra); or c) the list of relevant “different” 
factors is broader than those thus far recognized in cases explicitly decided under 
                                                                                                                            
77  Cf. Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without Parole?, 23 FED. 
SENT’G  REP. 1, 2 (2010). 
78  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2014–17.   
79  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–60.  
80  The other LWOP case was Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).  
81  Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).  The Harmelin and Ewing modifications to the Solem 
standards are discussed in text at notes 110–13, infra. 




the categorical approach (more on this possibility below). 
 
3. Older Eighth Amendment violation cases (neither death penalty nor 
LWOP) 
 
In two earlier cases, the Court found a penalty to be cruel and unusual 
punishment.82  After Graham, one commentator concluded that both of these 
earlier cases had imposed categorical bans on the penalties at issue.  83 But it is not 
clear whether that is the best reading of these cases, especially the first one. 
In Weems v. United States,84 the Court struck down a Philippine penalty, 
“cadena temporal,” because of its severity (fifteen years at “hard and painful” 
labor, in chains), its unusual accessories relative to common law traditions (life-
long supervision and loss of civil rights), and the minor nature of the conviction 
offense (falsifying two government accounts entries, with no required showing of 
any resulting harm or intent to defraud or otherwise cause harm).  This decision 
could perhaps be seen as an early version of Solem v. Helm analysis: the Court 
compared the cadena penalty’s severity to the minor nature of the offense, and 
arguably also performed versions of Solem intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis 
(noting equal or less serious penalties for homicide and other serious crimes, and 
the absence of penalties similar to cadena in the United States).85  It is difficult, 
however, to (retrospectively) view this holding as a categorical ban.  At least in 
practice, Weems did not ban cadena temporal under all circumstances.  Philippine 
officials appear to have interpreted the ruling as limited to minor crimes and 
continued to use cadena sentences for violent offenses.86 Prohibiting a penalty only 
in cases of minor crimes does not provide a very workable categorical rule, and the 
only other arguably “different” factor in that case was the unusualness of the 
penalty.87  Assuming Weems is still good law on its facts, that case should 
                                                                                                                            
82  The decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), was also grounded in the 
Eighth Amendment, but the challenge was not to the sentence but rather to the imposition of any 
punishment for the status of being a drug addict.  Although the Court said that “Even one day in 
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold,” id. at 
667, this case is really more about the (minimal) constitutional limits on criminal liability and has 
little in common with Eighth Amendment proportionality case law. 
83  Eva S. Nilsen, From Harmelin to Graham—Justice Kennedy Stakes Out a Path to 
Proportional Punishment, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 67, 68 (2010).  
84  217 U.S. 349 (1910).  
85  Id. at 363–67, 380–81. 
86  See Stinneford, supra note 47, at 910 n.38 (citing Margaret Raymond, “No Fellow In 
American Legislation”: Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of Proportionality, 30 VT. L. REV. 
251, 293–95 (2006)). 
87  On one view of the Eighth Amendment, the term “unusual” plays a critical role, embodying 
the founders’ intent to prohibit severe penalties that are “contrary to long usage.”  See John F. 
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1765 (2008).  
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probably be deemed an as-applied proportionality ruling.   
In Trop v. Dulles,88  the Court held that expatriation (stripping a native-born 
American of his citizenship) imposed for wartime desertion and dishonorable 
discharge violated the Eighth Amendment.  Four justices appeared to view the 
penalty of expatriation as unconstitutional per se—a kind of categorical ruling, but 
one difficult to harmonize with the Court’s subsequent categorical-ban cases; the 
only arguable “that’s different” factor cited was the fact that “civilized nations . . . 
are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for 
crime.”89  Nor does the plurality’s approach resemble subsequent as-applied 
proportionality analysis—the minor nature of some desertion crimes is only briefly 
mentioned, and no emphasis is given to the facts of defendant’s crime.90  If the 
plurality opinion is deemed to be the holding of the case, perhaps the best way to 
reconcile Trop with contemporary categorical bans under the Eighth Amendment 
is to view expatriation as a method of punishment (akin to execution by burning or 
quartering) that is so cruel and inhumane that it is banned under all circumstances. 
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Trop provided the necessary fifth 
vote supporting the decision, and since his holding would seem to sweep less 
broadly, it should perhaps be deemed the controlling rationale.91  Brennan began 
by noting that the “harshness of the punishment may be an important consideration 
where the asserted power to expatriate has only a slight or tenuous relation to the 
granted [war] power.”92  He then proceeded to, in effect, apply the “independent 
judgment” part of categorical analysis, examining whether expatriation could be 
justified under any of the traditional purposes of punishment.93  He concluded that 
it could not: expatriation is “the very antithesis of rehabilitation” (since it treats the 
offender as a complete outcast, thus probably encouraging anti-social tendencies); 
it has a weak effect as an added deterrent (on top of the direct penalties for 
desertion, up to and including the death penalty); and it has no incapacitative effect 
unless the deserter is also banished from the country.94  As for retribution, Brennan 
noted that some desertions are technical or very minor, and that was certainly true 
in this case, although Brennan did not emphasize this point.95 
                                                                                                                            
88  356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
89  Id. at 102.  The plurality also suggested that, if the word “unusual” in the Eighth 
Amendment had any separate significance, it should mean “something different from that which is 
generally done,” which the plurality felt was true of the denaturalization penalty at issue since it was 
not explicitly used as a penalty until 1940.  Id. at 100 n.32.  Cf. Stinneford, supra note 87.  
90  Trop, 356 U.S. at 87–88, 90–91. 
91  See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
92  Trop, 356 U.S. at 110 (Brennan, J., concurring).   
93  Id. at 111. 
94  Id. at 87 (plurality opinion)  
95  The defendant had escaped from military confinement on a base in Casablanca, but was on 
his way back to the base when an army truck came along and he boarded it with no words spoken.  
Id.   




In sum: the plurality opinion in Trop suggests a categorical ban, but not one 
closely tied to proportionality or justified by any of the “differents” recognized in 
later categorical-ban cases.  Justice Brennan’s deciding vote provides a more 
substantive, punishment-goals rationale, foreshadowing part of the Court’s 
subsequent categorical-rule analysis but lacking any “different” factor other than 
the rarity with which expatriation has been used as a punishment.   
 
D. Expansions to Adult Sentencing: Are There Now Possibly Five Votes to 
Overrule Harmelin? 
 
The defects of severe mandatory penalties, recognized in Miller, raise the 
question of whether some mandatory, non-capital penalties might also be found 
unconstitutional when applied to adults.  Such a claim was, of course, rejected by 
five justices in Harmelin v. Michigan.96  And of course, juveniles are different.  
But Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved since Harmelin was decided.  
The discussion below will consider arguments in favor of overruling Harmelin on 
its facts (section E will consider whether Harmelin might at least be limited, so 
that an adult case presenting additional “differents” could result in a successful 
categorical challenge). 
On its face, Miller provides little reason to think that Harmelin’s acceptance 
of mandatory adult LWOP penalties will be overruled any time soon—Justice 
Kagan explicitly distinguished Harmelin on its facts, and emphasized the children-
are-different argument.97  But as Kagan also noted, Harmelin was partly based on a 
death-is-different rationale.98  That rationale now carries less weight in light of the 
Court’s application of death penalty principles to non-capital sentencing in 
Graham and Miller.  If the Court wished, it could further limit Harmelin by 
pointing out that the defendant in that case had essentially raised a Solem-type, as-
applied challenge, making at most a death penalty “analogy” argument.99  It was 
not until Graham that the Court was required to squarely address a categorical 
challenge to a prison sentence.  
But would the Court wish to overrule Harmelin on its facts and recognize a 
categorical ban on mandatory LWOP in such cases?  And how could it do so 
without opening up a potentially broad range of adult penalties to categorical 
challenge?  Applying the different-enough schema presented in section C above, 
the first question is: were there at least three important “different” factors in 
                                                                                                                            
 The plurality and Justice Brennan also made slippery-slope arguments, questioning whether 
Congress could impose expatriation on anyone who violated any serious duty of citizenship, e.g., for 
tax evasion, violation of election laws, bank robbery, or drug crimes.  Id. at 90–93 (plurality opinion); 
id. at 113 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
96  501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
97  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012). 
98  Id.  
99  Brief of Petitioner, at 21 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (No. 89-7272).  
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Harmelin’s case?  The answer is yes.  Indeed, there may have been four: 
 
• LWOP 
• Mandatory penalty 
• Nonhomicide conviction offense 
• First offender 
 
The first three of these “different” factors have already been recognized in 
death penalty and juvenile LWOP cases, and the fourth factor is arguably implicit 
in the Court’s habitual offender cases.  If adult repeat offenders can be subjected to 
severe prison penalties,100 the opposite offending pattern—complete lack of prior 
convictions—surely ought to count as an important factor arguing against such a 
penalty. 
As for what remains of the national consensus prong of categorical analysis, 
the case for overruling Harmelin is even stronger.  As was pointed out in Justice 
White’s dissenting opinion in Harmelin, no other state would have punished such 
an offender even “nearly” as severely.101 
But of course, adults are different from juveniles.  Why should the Court take 
even a small step toward expanding categorical analysis to adult sentencing?  Why 
should even a severe mandatory penalty like the one at issue in Harmelin permit 
such an expansion?  The answer to the latter question is that the vices of 
mandatory LWOP penalties are not limited to juveniles.  Such laws virtually 
guarantee that some offenders subject to the law will receive punishment that is 
excessive and unjustified under all traditional purposes of punishment—exceeding 
upper retributive limits, failing to provide much if any incapacitative or additional 
deterrent benefit, and (by definition, for an LWOP sentence) “foreswear[ing] 
altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”102  Of course, adult offenders as a group do not 
present the unique characteristics that make juveniles, as a group, less culpable, 
less deterrable, more likely to cease being dangerous enough to require 
incapacitation at some point before they die in prison, and less competent to assist 
in their defense.  But mitigating culpability factors, limited deterrability, uncertain 
long-term dangerousness, and reduced defense competency are not infrequently 
found in adult cases.  The mandatory LWOP penalty prevents the sentencing court 
as well as later judicial or correctional releasing authorities from considering any 
such facts.  
                                                                                                                            
100 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per 
curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).   
101 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1026 (White, J., dissenting).  The dissent also foreshadowed the later 
expansion of death penalty principles to LWOP cases by stating that the lack of counterparts to Mr. 
Harmelin’s sentence, in other jurisdictions, “is enough to establish the degree of national consensus 
this Court has previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.”  Id. 
at 1027 (internal quotations omitted).    
102 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2017, 2030 (2011)).  




As noted previously, the categorical rules adopted in the Court’s recent cases 
appear to reflect a deliberate preference for bright-line, overbroad rules in place of 
case-specific assessments.  Such rules are easier for trial and appellate courts to 
apply, reduce sentencing disparity, and avoid the risk that as-applied challenges 
will fail to detect and prevent all constitutionally-excessive penalties.  Almost all 
of these rationales apply to adults as well as juveniles.  Even if a lower percentage 
of adult cases pose serious risks of excessive punishment, the much higher volume 
of adult cases increases the burden on courts of using as-applied standards and 
increases the potential number of unconstitutionally severe sentences.   
Although not expressly mentioned in Miller, another vice of mandatory 
penalties is the power they give to prosecutors, not only to dictate (or avoid) severe 
“sentences,” but also to coerce guilty pleas.  In fact, these problems were 
illustrated by the facts of these two cases.  In both Miller and Jackson the 
defendants were tried as adults only because the District Attorney exercised the 
discretion to file adult-court charges or request removal to that court.103  Miller’s 
co-defendant avoided LWOP by being allowed to plead guilty to a lesser charge in 
return for testifying against Miller.104 
Despite all the arguments above, the Court may decline to overrule Harmelin 
on its facts.  The Court is always reluctant to openly admit error, and juveniles 
truly are different as a group; they also constitute a readily-defined class of 
offenders.  In effect, the Court may decide that juveniles are really different, like 
the death penalty, so that at a minimum it will take more than two other 
“differents” to justify categorical bans on adult LWOP penalties.  This possibility 
will be examined in the next section. 
 
E. Are There Five Votes to at Least Further Limit Harmelin? 
 
Even if Harmelin will not be overruled on its facts, will the Court apply 
categorical analysis and invalidate a mandatory LWOP sentence in cases 
presenting additional previously- or newly-recognized “different” factors?  
Clearly, Harmelin’s reach has already been limited: Graham held that at least 
some LWOPs imposed for a nonhomicide crime are unconstitutional;105 Miller 
held that, even for homicide crimes, at least some mandatory LWOP penalties are 
unconstitutional.106  In both of those cases, Harmelin was limited because juveniles 
are different.  
But some adult cases are arguably just as categorically “different” as juvenile 
cases, at least when certain other factors, not present in Harmelin, are present.  
Perhaps the addition of one or more other “different” factors would tip the 
                                                                                                                            
103 Id. at 2461–62; Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).  
104 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
105 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2011 (2010). 
106 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at  2457–60 (2012). 
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constitutional scale, permit categorical analysis, and lead to a finding of 
unconstitutionality.  The most compelling case for this result would be one 
including the four actual Harmelin “differents,” plus two others that have already 
been recognized in death penalty107 cases (the last two listed below): 
 
• LWOP 
• Mandatory penalty 
• Nonhomicide conviction offense 
• First offender 
• Mentally retarded offender 
• Low-culpability accomplice 
 
Indeed, perhaps only one of the last two factors would be required.  Both 
involve low offender culpability, and in Atkins and Enmund the Court found each 
factor, alone, sufficient to ban the death penalty even in a homicide case.108  If the 
hypothetical “new Harmelin” defendant were mentally retarded, or if Mr. 
Harmelin’s wife or girlfriend were held liable as an accomplice but with only a 
minor role in the crime, the arguments for applying a categorical prohibition 
against mandatory LWOP would be very strong.  And the arguments might still be 
strong even if the hypothetical accomplice or mentally retarded defendant was not 
a first offender.  In Atkins and Enmund, the offenders’ prior records did not seem 
to enter into the Court’s decisions.109 
But again, the Court may conclude that juveniles are so “different” that 
categorical bans of the kind recognized in Graham and Miller should not be 
extended to adult prison sentences no matter how many other “different” factors 
are present.  In that event (or in any case not covered by or suitable for whatever 
new categorical challenges the Court permits in adult prison-sentence cases), as-
applied analysis, using the Solem-Harmelin-Ewing standards, will remain the only 
way to raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to the sentence.  But as discussed in 
Part II below, a strong argument can be made that the Solem-Harmelin-Ewing 
standards are now easier to meet when one or more “different” factors is present.   
 
II. USING “DIFFERENT” FACTORS TO SUPPORT AS-APPLIED (SOLEM-HARMELIN-
EWING) CHALLENGES 
 
In the discussion above, I examined various ways in which the categorical 
                                                                                                                            
107 Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, concurring in Miller, showed that they were willing to 
apply the low-culpability-accomplice factor in an LWOP case, pointing to the facts of Jackson.  Id. 
(Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring).  
108 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
109 Mr. Atkins had sixteen prior felony convictions, including for robbery and assault.  Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Mr. Enmund had previously been convicted of at least one 
“felony involving the use or threat of violence.”  Enmund, 458 U.S. at 785. 




approach might be applied to some severe adult prison sentences, especially 
mandatory LWOP penalties.  But given the Court’s strong emphasis in Graham 
and Miller on the particular characteristics of juvenile offenders and the 
similarities between death sentences and LWOP, it may turn out that categorical 
analysis will be limited to death-penalty and juvenile-LWOP cases.  Accordingly, 
this part of the essay assumes that many if not all adult prison sentences will 
continue to be governed by as-applied (Solem-Harmelin-Ewing) analysis.  
Nevertheless, the Court’s treatment of LWOP, mandatory penalties, and other 
“different” factors applied in its recent categorical-challenge cases may suggest 
new grounds for Eighth Amendment relief in as-applied challenges.  If the 
presence of such “different” factors indicates a heightened risk of disproportionate 
punishment, sometimes justifying more protective categorical analysis, such 
factors would also seem to indicate a heightened risk that this defendant’s sentence 
is disproportionate, adding support to the defendant’s as-applied challenge 
notwithstanding the limits imposed in Harmelin and Ewing. 
Those limits were substantial, arguably putting an end to almost all as-applied 
challenges.110 In Harmelin, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion modified the three-
factor Solem standards by specifying that courts should only apply the second and 
third factors (intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons) “in the rare case in which 
[under Solem factor one] a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.”111  But if 
mandatory LWOP for a first-offender charged with simple possession of drugs 
(albeit a very large quantity) does not raise such an inference, what would?  
In Ewing, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion not only approved of 
Kennedy’s “threshold” requirement, but added a further pre-requisite to any 
consideration of the second and third Solem factors that had at most been implicit 
in Solem:112 when applying the first factor, the gravity of the defendant’s “offense” 
is not limited to the crime(s) being sentenced—it also includes, and is increased in 
proportion to, his prior record of convictions.113  
The remainder of this part considers how the Court’s recent categorical-
challenge cases might help defendants meet the strict Solem-Harmelin-Ewing 
standards.  Section A argues that Graham, Miller, and other categorical cases may 
make it easier to get past the Harmelin-Ewing threshold test, in cases raising the 
“different” factors recognized in those cases.  Section B considers how the second 
and third Solem factors might be applied, in light of the Court’s cited factors and/or 
                                                                                                                            
110 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 15. 
111 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991). 
112 In Solem, Justice Powell noted that Mr. Helm was charged not just with passing a bad 
check “but also with being an habitual offender,” and Powell further conceded, “a State is justified in 
punishing a recidivist more severely.”  Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 (1983).  But Powell also 
stated that the Court “must focus on the . . . felony that triggers the life sentence . . . since Helm 
already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses.”  Id. at 296 n.21. 
113 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29–30 (2003). 
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overall approach in recent categorical decisions.    
 
A. Meeting the Harmelin/Ewing “Threshold” Test  
 
Even if categorical analysis will not be used to overrule or limit Harmelin 
(sections D and E above), the presence of one or more “different” factors 
recognized in categorical-challenge cases may make it easier for defendants to get 
past the threshold test and move on to Solem factors two and three.  
 
1. LWOP Sentences 
 
Life without the possibility of parole—death in prison—has now been 
officially recognized in multiple cases (Solem, Graham, Miller) as an extremely 
severe penalty.114  Although the Court stated that LWOP is particularly severe for a 
juvenile,115 it also noted factors that arguably also make LWOP very severe for 
most adult offenders, especially younger ones: the sentence “alters the remainder 
of his life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable,” denying all hope of restoration; and 
the younger an offender is, the more years in prison they face and the greater the 
proportion of their life that is forfeited.116  Just as mandatory penalties prevent the 
sentencing court from considering constitutionally relevant mitigating factors, 
LWOP prevents parole boards and correctional authorities from considering 
positive changes in the offender’s risk level and/or character, no matter how 
extensive those changes might be, over periods that will often be measured in 
decades.  Such considerations may serve to tip the scale in the threshold analysis, 
permitting sentencing courts to consider intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons 
in at least some adult LWOP cases.  Indeed, Justice Kagan’s dictum that 
constitutionally permissible juvenile LWOP sentences will be “uncommon”117 
clearly indicates a willingness to find an Eighth Amendment violation in at least 
some future as-applied challenges. 
But of course—juveniles are different.  Prosecutors will argue that the Court’s 
comments about LWOP in Graham and Miller have no application when 
evaluating adult prison sentences.  However, each of the constitutionally relevant 
mitigating characteristics of juveniles, cited in these cases, is also present for some 
adults.  Even if these characteristics are not sufficiently frequent enough among 
adult offenders to justify a categorical ban on LWOP sentences, they certainly 
seem relevant to as-applied analysis and the Harmelin/Ewing threshold test: 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
114 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); 
Solem, 463 U.S. at 277. 
115 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
116 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (internal quotations omitted). 
117 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 




• Lack of maturity, recklessness, and impetuosity, resulting in 
heedless risk-taking—many adult crimes involve spur-of-the-
moment decisions by immature offenders; 
• Greater vulnerability to negative influences and pressures from 
family and/or peers—many adult offenders are similarly vulnerable, 
in particular: low-level gang members, abused wives and 
girlfriends, and mentally-retarded offenders (a “different” factor that 
has already been specifically recognized in adult sentencing, despite 
the absence of capacity to change—see further discussions below); 
• Greater capacity to change for the better, becoming less dangerous 
and less anti-social (character not as well formed; less reason to 
posit “irretrievable depravity”)—addicts and other adult offenders 
with treatable crime-causing conditions also have a substantial 
capacity to change and become law-abiding citizens.  
 
2. Mandatory LWOP 
 
Even where the arguments above are deemed insufficient to pass the 
Harmelin/Ewing threshold test when applied to a discretionary LWOP penalty, 
those arguments might tip the scale in some cases of mandatory LWOP, since that 
combination has now effectively been recognized as an even more severe penalty 
than discretionary LWOP. 
 
3. LWOP plus other “differents” 
 
In addition to the mandatory+LWOP combination, it may be that LWOP plus 
one or more other recognized “different” factor will be sufficient to pass the 
threshold test.  In particular, courts arguably should be allowed to move on to 
intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons when an LWOP penalty (especially if 
mandatory) is imposed for a nonhomicide crime committed by an offender who 
suffers from mental retardation (the Atkins factor), or who was held liable on an 
accomplice theory involving minimal personal culpability (Enmund).118  Indeed, it 
can be argued that the retardation and minor-accomplice factors should apply even 
to offenders with substantial prior conviction records, since the latter factor was 
not mentioned by the Court when it recognized those factors.119  Of course, those 
were death penalty cases, but it seems that death is not as different as it once was. 
What about other potential “different” factors, combined with LWOP?  In my 
earlier discussion of whether it might be possible to view Solem v. Helm as a 
categorical ruling, I pointed to several factors in that case (in addition to LWOP), 
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him some of the money he used to buy the drugs.   
119 See supra text accompanying notes 108-09 for a discussion of Atkins and Enmund. 
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two of which might help meet the Harmelin/Ewing threshold test: 
 
• Minor, non-violent conviction offense 
• Non-violent prior record 
 
The first of these factors is actually just a stronger version of the 
nonhomicide-offense factor recognized in death penalty (Coker, Kennedy) and 
LWOP cases (Graham).  The second factor above bears no direct relationship to 
any recognized “different” factor.  Indeed, in Harmelin even the complete absence 
of prior convictions seemed to be given little weight in the Court’s threshold 
analysis.  But surely that view is wrong.  If, as the Ewing plurality opinion tells us, 
an extensive prior record enhances the gravity of the defendant’s “offense” in 
“threshold” analysis,120 this factor must cut in both directions—mitigating the 
gravity of “the offense” when the defendant has no prior record or only a minor 
record.  
 
4. Severe non-LWOP prison terms 
 
If enough “different” factors are present, should a lengthy non-LWOP prison 
term sometimes also raise a threshold inference of gross disproportionality?  The 
strongest case would seem to be a prison sentence with a minimum time to serve 
that is so clearly beyond the defendant’s life expectancy that it constitutes LWOP 
for all practical purposes.121  Of course, if the Court prefers simplistic, bright-line 
rules (as its recent endorsement of categorical limits seems to suggest it does, see 
section I.A above), then the Court may be willing to pretend that such de facto 
LWOP sentences do not exist, or are constitutionally “different” from actual, de 
jure LWOP.   
Even then, perhaps the addition of other “different” factors would tip the scale 
and allow de facto LWOP sentences (and even very severe, almost-de-facto-
LWOP sentences) to meet the Harmelin/Ewing threshold test—provided enough 
“different” factors are present.  For example, suppose a defendant like Jerry Helm, 
in Solem (conviction offense: issuing a $100 no-account check; prior convictions: 
all for non-violent property crimes), had been given a 50-year, mandatory-
minimum prison term, and that Mr. Helm also suffered from mental retardation.  
 
B. Applying the Second and Third Solem Factors  
 
                                                                                                                            
120 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003). 
121 See Frase, supra note 37, at 588 (noting the sentence in Ewing was equivalent to LWOP);  
see generally William W. Berry, III, The Mandatory Meaning of Miller, AM. CRIM. L. REV., available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112820 (arguing that Miller should be 
extended to bar mandatory sentences in all “death-in-custody cases,” including term-of-years prison 
terms “approaching the life expectancy of the offender”).  




Assuming that a court finds the threshold Harmelin/Ewing test to have been 
met, how might the Court’s categorical decisions affect application of Solem’s 
intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparison factors?  Those two factors would have 
lent substantial support to finding Eighth Amendment violations in both Harmelin 
and Ewing.122  The Court’s recent categorical decisions may not only make it 
easier to reach the second and third Solem factors, but also easier for defendants to 
find support in them for a finding of (gross) disproportionality. 
 
1. Intra-jurisdictional comparisons (Solem-2) 
 
If the Court is moving toward a unitary set of Eighth Amendment standards 
(see further discussion in subsection 2 below), the absence of any counterpart of 
the second Solem factor in the two-step categorical analysis may indicate that this 
factor will eventually be discarded.  But if it is retained for as-applied challenges, it 
may be easier to meet in light of the categorical cases.   
In Solem, Justice Powell suggested that, “[i]f more serious crimes are subject 
to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the 
punishment at issue may be excessive.”123  At a minimum, the nonhomicide-is-
different factor—which after Graham is no longer limited to death penalty cases—
suggests that a court examining a severe penalty given for a drug, property, or 
other non-violent crime should pay particular attention to how this jurisdiction 
punishes minor homicide crimes.  And in evaluating which penalties are “less 
serious,” any term-of-years penalty must be deemed constitutionally less severe 
than LWOP and especially mandatory LWOP.    
 
2. Inter-jurisdictional comparisons (Solem-3) 
 
In deciding whether the punishment at issue is excessive, Justice Powell 
stated that, “courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for 
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”124 
Although the Court has never made the connection explicit, the third Solem 
factor bears some resemblance to the “national consensus” prong of categorical 
analysis.  At some point, if the Court wishes to further consolidate its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, it may make this connection explicit, deleting the 
second Solem factor (intra-jurisdictional comparisons, which has no counterpart in 
categorical analysis), and applying similar inter-jurisdictional comparison 
standards to both categorical and as-applied challenges.  
With or without such consolidation, the Court’s recent applications of its 
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1025–27 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). 
123 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983). 
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2013 WHAT’S “DIFFERENT” (ENOUGH) IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT LAW? 35 
 
 
national consensus assessments suggests reduced emphasis on that factor in 
categorical challenges—and thus, perhaps, also in as-applied challenges.  As was 
noted in Part I, Justice Kagan’s Miller opinion delayed this assessment so that it 
followed rather than preceded the court’s “independent judgment.”  And in Miller 
and other recent cases, the Court has been willing to find “consensus” support for 
that judgment despite evidence that the challenged penalty was endorsed and 
applied in many other jurisdictions.125  If this softening is carried over to as-
applied challenges, it would mean that severe penalties would not have to be (as 
the penalty was in Solem) more severe than would be imposed in any other 
jurisdiction.   
In both Graham and Miller, the apparent softening of the national consensus 
assessment was facilitated by the Court’s observation that the challenged penalty 
may have resulted from an unforeseen interaction of separate juvenile-waiver and 
adult-sentencing rules.  The Court concluded that if the challenged penalty does 
not necessarily reflect “deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration,”126  
there is less reason for the Court to defer to the legislature.  A similar argument 
may sometimes also be available in adult as-applied cases, for example, where a 
severe mandatory-minimum penalty interacts with broad conspiracy- and 
accomplice-liability rules, making a minor participant fully liable for unintended 




Perhaps the Graham and Miller decisions have little or no implications for 
adult sentencing because “children are constitutionally different.”128 Then again, 
perhaps these cases mark the beginning of a pendulum swing back toward at least 
some degree of Eighth Amendment regulation of extreme adult prison sentences.  
Rather than overrule the severe limits that the Harmelin and Ewing pluralities put 
on the three-factor Solem test, maybe the Court has found a precedent saving work-
around, shifting to a categorical approach that actually provides meaningful 
constitutional protection.  And given the administrative burdens, inconsistent 
results, and inevitable under-breadth of as-applied adjudication, categorical 
                                                                                                                            
125 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2487–91 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
126 Id. at 2473 (majority opinion) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (2011)). 
127 The best-known example of broad liability of a secondary party for additional crimes 
committed by a co-offender is the rule in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648 (1946) 
(stating that all conspirators are liable for any crime committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of 
the conspiracy, unless that crime “could not be reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural 
consequence of the unlawful agreement”).  Some accomplice liability rules also sweep quite broadly, 
see, e.g., People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 (1984) (An accomplice is liable for any further 
crimes that are the “natural and reasonable consequences” of the crime the accomplice intentionally 
aided and abetted.); People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ill. 1974) (An accomplice is liable for “any 
criminal act done [by another party] in furtherance of the planned and intended act.”). 
128 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 




analysis is arguably the better approach anyway.   
But even if the Court recognizes little if any extension of categorical analysis 
beyond the death penalty and juvenile LWOP, the “different” factors recognized in 
those cases, which the Court felt required over-broad categorical bans, may make it 
easier for defendants to successfully raise as-applied challenges under the Solem-
Harmelin-Ewing standards.  Each of the recognized “different’ factors (and 
perhaps others not yet formally recognized) reflects a heightened risk of 
disproportionality.  When one or more of those factors is present it should add 
substantial support to a defendant’s as-applied challenge.  
 
 
